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What gives data meaning?
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| Thomas Gagne 2007-04-04, 7:07 pm |
| I was re-reading some of the messages under the subject "Databases as
objects" and ran across something Frans Bouma wrote:
Frans Bouma wrote:
> Thomas Gagne wrote:
>
>
>
>
> what's an improperly formatted zipcode? In the US, you have 5 digits,
> in the netherlands you have 4 digits and 2 characters. A zipcode of
> 1234 AA is properly formatted for a dutch user of the application, but
> not correctly formatted for the US user of the program. Hence: context.
>
> This thus means that if the db stores '1234AA', it can do so, and the
> dutch user will happily use it. The US user can't because for the US
> user it's just data, 1234 and 2 characters, it's not information
> (zipcode).
If you think about it, neither zip code means anything to the database.
They're simply characters in a field. It's the /reader/ who derives
information from them. The only way a DB might know something about zip
codes is if the field were a FK to known zip codes, then the DB might
assert referential integrity, but still know nothing of the meaning of
"1234 AA." Only the post office and its customers are impacted by its
meaning.
So that takes us back to whether or not the database is correct beyond
its integrity checks. If it stores exactly what it should store then it
is correct. An incorrect or improperly formatted zip code isn't the
database's responsibility if that's what a human or application told it
to store. A DB wouldn't know it was correct or not until it tried
delivering the mail--or performing some function with the data.
This is the same problem with adding apples and oranges, or USD and
CAD. Where I able to store $1USD and $2CAD in an attribute that by
itself isn't necessarily wrong. It may, however, be an inability of a
function to find meaning to adding them together, or the unwillingness
of a bank to ACH 1USD+1CAD, even though people familiar with both
algebra and currency codes recognize exactly what the expression is and
what it means. After crossing the border to Windsor I may end up with
both USD and CAD in my wallet.
This reinforces the DB can be responsible for structural, type, and
referential integrity, but it can not give meaning to its data.
"Incorrect" data, having passed the three tests the DB can apply, is
only incorrect to those is has meaning for.
So this takes us back to our responsibility as programmers and designers
to guard our database's integrity. In the same way OO programmers guard
their objects' integrity by restricting access to object state, why
would they regard a DB's state any less by allowing any and all to
manipulate rows and attributes however and wherever they wish?
--
Visit <http://blogs.instreamfinancial.com/anything.php>
to read my rants on technology and the finance industry.
| |
| Stefan Ram 2007-04-04, 7:07 pm |
| Thomas Gagne <tgagne@wide-open-west.com> writes:
>What gives data meaning?
A specification of a semantics that is accepted by at least
one party engaging in an act of communication.
A semantics is a map (in the mathematical sense) from a set
of symbols (this set is called the syntax) to another set
(which is the set of meanings).
To determine the meaning of a datum, one needs the additional
information about the semantics to be used, and one needs to
assure that the datum is an element of the syntax, then one
can apply the semantics to the datum to obtain the meaning.
This was the explanation of meaning for a formal language.
Eventually, a semantics has to be specified using a natural
language, which has been learned by means of natural meanings
shared by parties (e.g., when someone cries »Ouch!« after
being hit by a hammer and you already know how this feels, you
might be able to infer the meaning of »Ouch!«).
One can never really be sure, whether meaning can really be
shared (http://google.to/ie?q=Quine+inscrutability).
| |
|
|
There's a great book I can recommend here:
"Semantics in Business Systems" by Dave McComb
- Morgan Kauffman Publishers 2004
The basic goal of this book (as I an perceive)
is to show that Programs Create Meaning,
- and on another level, of course the programmers
who create the programs. Or perhaps more simply
put: Programs *assign* meaning to data.
Data is just data. But a program that manipulates
it and presents it to humans, and to other programs,
turns it into meaningful information.
It is really the same phenomenon as writing a program
that DECRYPTS a senseless stream of ones and zeros.
Programs behave in a certain way when they encounter
certain data. So do people - when they encounter
certain *information*. THIS is what gives data
its meaning, its potential of causing reproducible
events in the world.
If the data can not be interpreted, it is meaningless,
and nothing much happens. At most: an Error-report,
if it was expected that that data should be interpretable.
(Just like when your best friend or your boss starts
uttering unintelligible gibberish. An error-report is
needed)
So, humans create meaning by reacting to messages
in a reproducible, common manner. Programs create
meaning by translating data into characters and
graphics, which humans can 'understand'.
So how does this all relate to objects vs. tables
of numbers? Objects encode the rules by which to
react to certain patterns of data. Thus they are one
level closer to 'meaning'.
- Panu Viljamaa
Thomas Gagne wrote:
> I was re-reading some of the messages under the subject "Databases as
> objects" and ran across something Frans Bouma wrote:
>
> Frans Bouma wrote:
> If you think about it, neither zip code means anything to the database.
> They're simply characters in a field. It's the /reader/ who derives
> information from them. The only way a DB might know something about zip
> codes is if the field were a FK to known zip codes, then the DB might
> assert referential integrity, but still know nothing of the meaning of
> "1234 AA." Only the post office and its customers are impacted by its
> meaning.
>
> So that takes us back to whether or not the database is correct beyond
> its integrity checks. If it stores exactly what it should store then it
> is correct. An incorrect or improperly formatted zip code isn't the
> database's responsibility if that's what a human or application told it
> to store. A DB wouldn't know it was correct or not until it tried
> delivering the mail--or performing some function with the data.
>
> This is the same problem with adding apples and oranges, or USD and
> CAD. Where I able to store $1USD and $2CAD in an attribute that by
> itself isn't necessarily wrong. It may, however, be an inability of a
> function to find meaning to adding them together, or the unwillingness
> of a bank to ACH 1USD+1CAD, even though people familiar with both
> algebra and currency codes recognize exactly what the expression is and
> what it means. After crossing the border to Windsor I may end up with
> both USD and CAD in my wallet.
>
> This reinforces the DB can be responsible for structural, type, and
> referential integrity, but it can not give meaning to its data.
> "Incorrect" data, having passed the three tests the DB can apply, is
> only incorrect to those is has meaning for.
>
> So this takes us back to our responsibility as programmers and designers
> to guard our database's integrity. In the same way OO programmers guard
> their objects' integrity by restricting access to object state, why
> would they regard a DB's state any less by allowing any and all to
> manipulate rows and attributes however and wherever they wish?
>
| |
| topmind 2007-04-12, 10:06 pm |
|
panu wrote:
> There's a great book I can recommend here:
> "Semantics in Business Systems" by Dave McComb
> - Morgan Kauffman Publishers 2004
>
> The basic goal of this book (as I an perceive)
> is to show that Programs Create Meaning,
> - and on another level, of course the programmers
> who create the programs. Or perhaps more simply
> put: Programs *assign* meaning to data.
>
> Data is just data. But a program that manipulates
> it and presents it to humans, and to other programs,
> turns it into meaningful information.
That is almost like saying that the CPU is more important than
MyProgram.exe because MyProgram.exe is "just a data file" (a list of
op-codes). Or that a sheet of music is "less than" a conductor.
Beetoven is not a conductor, so he is less important? I view it more
as a Yin and Yang rather than "Yang has a bigger yang", or the like.
Data and behavior are generally different views of the same thing,
analogous to energy vs. matter.
[color=darkred]
>
> It is really the same phenomenon as writing a program
> that DECRYPTS a senseless stream of ones and zeros.
>
> Programs behave in a certain way when they encounter
> certain data. So do people - when they encounter
> certain *information*. THIS is what gives data
> its meaning, its potential of causing reproducible
> events in the world.
>
> If the data can not be interpreted, it is meaningless,
> and nothing much happens. At most: an Error-report,
> if it was expected that that data should be interpretable.
> (Just like when your best friend or your boss starts
> uttering unintelligible gibberish. An error-report is
> needed)
>
> So, humans create meaning by reacting to messages
> in a reproducible, common manner. Programs create
> meaning by translating data into characters and
> graphics, which humans can 'understand'.
>
> So how does this all relate to objects vs. tables
> of numbers? Objects encode the rules by which to
> react to certain patterns of data. Thus they are one
> level closer to 'meaning'.
>
> - Panu Viljamaa
>
>
>
> Thomas Gagne wrote:
-T-
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-12, 10:06 pm |
| On 12 Apr 2007 12:36:56 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
wrote:
>
>panu wrote:
>
>That is almost like saying that the CPU is more important than
>MyProgram.exe because MyProgram.exe is "just a data file" (a list of
>op-codes).
It's not a matter of "more important", it's a matter of "unpacking"
the phenomenon of computation, and looking at a particular situation,
and when the raw stuff (data, bits) becomes the cooked stuff
(meaning).
> Or that a sheet of music is "less than" a conductor.
It's more a matter of seeing that both contribute.
If you're looking for meaning, the conductor standing there with
nothing to do, is not meaningful, and the sheet music sitting there
with nobody playing it, is not realizing its intensional meaning.
>Beethoven is not a conductor, so he is less important? I view it more
>as a Yin and Yang rather than "Yang has a bigger yang", or the like.
>Data and behavior are generally different views of the same thing,
>analogous to energy vs. matter.
Um, careful there. Data and program are interchangeable, you can make
equivalent Turing machines by exchanging tape states for machine
states to a very large degree, while keeping behavior more or less
constant, depending how you define things. You can find many
different programs/machines to produce the same behavior from
different data.
Just saying there is a lot of fine detail in this to be scoped out.
J.
| |
| topmind 2007-04-13, 4:15 am |
|
JXStern wrote:
> On 12 Apr 2007 12:36:56 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> It's not a matter of "more important", it's a matter of "unpacking"
> the phenomenon of computation, and looking at a particular situation,
> and when the raw stuff (data, bits) becomes the cooked stuff
> (meaning).
>
>
> It's more a matter of seeing that both contribute.
>
> If you're looking for meaning, the conductor standing there with
> nothing to do, is not meaningful, and the sheet music sitting there
> with nobody playing it, is not realizing its intensional meaning.
>
>
> Um, careful there. Data and program are interchangeable, you can make
> equivalent Turing machines by exchanging tape states for machine
> states to a very large degree, while keeping behavior more or less
> constant, depending how you define things. You can find many
> different programs/machines to produce the same behavior from
> different data.
>
> Just saying there is a lot of fine detail in this to be scoped out.
IMO, procedural/relational creates a nice Yin-Yang balance with
relational handling most of the noun-oriented idioms and standardizes
collection handling, while procedural provides the task-specific verb-
oriented idioms. OOP is the jack of both trades but master of none. P/
R provides specialization for both. OOP gets a C at handling
collections and relationships, a D for consistency, and perhaps a B at
behavior. Thus, it averages out to a C design.
>
> J.
-T-
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-13, 7:07 pm |
| On 12 Apr 2007 22:41:14 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
wrote:
>IMO, procedural/relational creates a nice Yin-Yang balance with
>relational handling most of the noun-oriented idioms and standardizes
>collection handling, while procedural provides the task-specific verb-
>oriented idioms. OOP is the jack of both trades but master of none. P/
>R provides specialization for both. OOP gets a C at handling
>collections and relationships, a D for consistency, and perhaps a B at
>behavior. Thus, it averages out to a C design.
Wasn't that the Coad/Yourdan theory of OO - class=noun, method=verb,
adj=property?
But that's all a different matter than giving data meaning. What
makes this string of bits mean owner-has-dog? What makes this string
of bits mean his OO program or your P/R program (means owner-has-dog)?
J.
| |
| Eliot Miranda 2007-04-13, 7:07 pm |
| topmind wrote:
> panu wrote:
>
> That is almost like saying that the CPU is more important than
> MyProgram.exe because MyProgram.exe is "just a data file" (a list of
> op-codes). Or that a sheet of music is "less than" a conductor.
> Beetoven is not a conductor, so he is less important? I view it more
> as a Yin and Yang rather than "Yang has a bigger yang", or the like.
> Data and behavior are generally different views of the same thing,
> analogous to energy vs. matter.
If you believe in a soul then the bio-chemical substrate of the body is
irrelevant to meaning. But if you're an atheist/materialist you'll
think that without the bio-chemical substrate that implements the brain
there can be no meaning. The meaning of music resides in epiphenomena
of the brain but without the brain's substrate, poof, its gone.
There are interesting issues in DNA (I'm treading on extremely thin ice
here because my reading is mostly limited to wikipedia) but its the
transcription and decoding machinery that gives meaning to a strand of
DNA. A given strand's interpretation depends very importantly on where
transcription/protein generation starts. Start one base pair further on
and the interpretation si completely different. Apparently DNA is full
of things like palindromes, multiple encodings of different protiens in
the same strand obtained by starting at different places, etc, etc. Of
course this is fabulously involuted and mutually recursive because the
transcription/protein generation is in some sense coded by DNA. It a
limited sense because DNA is functionally inert without the biochemical
context of the cell to provide preexisting machinery with which to
decode it. See e.g. Origins of Life by Freeman Dyson
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/A.../completereview)
that examines the origins of cells, concluding that cells (biochemical
context) come before cell replication (dna), i.e. that hardware preceeds
software.
Satan oscillate my metallic sonatas!
--
The surest sign that intelligent life exists elsewhere in Calvin &
the universe is that none of it has tried to contact us. Hobbes.
--
Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
| |
| topmind 2007-04-14, 4:12 am |
|
JXStern wrote:
> On 12 Apr 2007 22:41:14 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> Wasn't that the Coad/Yourdan theory of OO - class=noun, method=verb,
> adj=property?
>
> But that's all a different matter than giving data meaning. What
> makes this string of bits mean owner-has-dog? What makes this string
> of bits mean his OO program or your P/R program (means owner-has-dog)?
The programmer and the user. The CPU is merely a player-piano reading
the punch-hole roll that humans feed to it. It is merely faithful and
literal foot soldiers carrying the general's plans.
>
> J.
-T-
| |
| topmind 2007-04-14, 4:12 am |
|
Eliot Miranda wrote:
> topmind wrote:
>
> If you believe in a soul then the bio-chemical substrate of the body is
> irrelevant to meaning. But if you're an atheist/materialist you'll
> think that without the bio-chemical substrate that implements the brain
> there can be no meaning. The meaning of music resides in epiphenomena
> of the brain but without the brain's substrate, poof, its gone.
"Meaning" is relative. It is like asking if pi exists.
>
> There are interesting issues in DNA (I'm treading on extremely thin ice
> here because my reading is mostly limited to wikipedia) but its the
> transcription and decoding machinery that gives meaning to a strand of
> DNA. A given strand's interpretation depends very importantly on where
> transcription/protein generation starts. Start one base pair further on
> and the interpretation si completely different. Apparently DNA is full
> of things like palindromes, multiple encodings of different protiens in
> the same strand obtained by starting at different places, etc, etc. Of
> course this is fabulously involuted and mutually recursive because the
> transcription/protein generation is in some sense coded by DNA. It a
> limited sense because DNA is functionally inert without the biochemical
> context of the cell to provide preexisting machinery with which to
> decode it. See e.g. Origins of Life by Freeman Dyson
> (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/A.../completereview)
> that examines the origins of cells, concluding that cells (biochemical
> context) come before cell replication (dna), i.e. that hardware preceeds
> software.
>
>
> Satan oscillate my metallic sonatas!
I've found a tin-foil hat is helpful against that :-)
>
> --
> The surest sign that intelligent life exists elsewhere in Calvin &
> the universe is that none of it has tried to contact us. Hobbes.
> --
> Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
-T-
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-14, 10:11 pm |
| On 13 Apr 2007 22:16:02 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
wrote:
>
>The programmer and the user. The CPU is merely a player-piano reading
>the punch-hole roll that humans feed to it. It is merely faithful and
>literal foot soldiers carrying the general's plans.
That's one traditional answer, that humans have "original
intentionality" and computers, like written materials, have "derived
intentionality", intentionality understood as "meaning", "derived"
meaning derived from the privileged, if not entirely explained, human
intelligence.
That doesn't really work for me, for so many reasons, but I suppose
it's OT in programming newsgroups.
J.
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-14, 10:11 pm |
| On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 17:02:39 GMT, JXStern wrote:
> On 13 Apr 2007 22:16:02 -0700, "topmind" <topmind@technologist.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> That's one traditional answer, that humans have "original
> intentionality" and computers, like written materials, have "derived
> intentionality", intentionality understood as "meaning", "derived"
> meaning derived from the privileged, if not entirely explained, human
> intelligence.
>
> That doesn't really work for me, for so many reasons, but I suppose
> it's OT in programming newsgroups.
And what is your answer?
When possible, accompanied with an answer to a related question:
[do you believe that] meaning ("intelligence"?) is computable? (:-))
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| Thomas Gagne 2007-04-14, 10:11 pm |
| The point I was moving to is how seriously we seem to take the data
inside our databases as though it should be correct--and yet my last
name is misspelled nearly everywhere I go. I get my neighbor's mail.
Sometimes I get the mail for the previous owners. I get multiple copies
of catalogs--some using different spellings of my name, some with my
wife's name, some with different flavors of my address that all
basically end-up the same place.
And programmers think data has meaning?
This is what I was referring to when I mentioned the uncertainty
principle. I don't believe any database can be sufficiently constrained
to know everything because it's impossible. Most DBs stop somewhere
short of constraining everything because they really can't know every
address and new ones are being created every day while others are being
eliminated. Zip codes are nearly as annoying.
What gives data meaning, I think, is what (who) uses it--and sometimes
even they (we) get it wrong. Whether it's a person or a formula. The
postman gives meaning to addresses when he/she delivers it to my
address. I give meaning to the spelling of my last name. Mathematics
gives meaning (purpose?) to operands. How is the database supposed to
know how to correctly spell my last name? It can't "know" anything.
Even if I told it the DB only keeps what it was told. It hasn't
meaning. It only has a value and the DB's job is to keep it.
So when we talk about semantics and how relational databases can test
them, and that maintaining the semantic correctness is a responsibility
of the DB, implemented via , that responsibility is supported by OO's
concept of high cohesion.
As fascinating as the search for intelligence is, it wasn't really where
we started. But good stuff!
--
Visit <http://blogs.instreamfinancial.com/anything.php>
to read my rants on technology and the finance industry.
| |
| topmind 2007-04-14, 10:11 pm |
|
Thomas Gagne wrote:
> The point I was moving to is how seriously we seem to take the data
> inside our databases as though it should be correct--and yet my last
> name is misspelled nearly everywhere I go. I get my neighbor's mail.
> Sometimes I get the mail for the previous owners. I get multiple copies
> of catalogs--some using different spellings of my name, some with my
> wife's name, some with different flavors of my address that all
> basically end-up the same place.
>
> And programmers think data has meaning?
>
> This is what I was referring to when I mentioned the uncertainty
> principle. I don't believe any database can be sufficiently constrained
> to know everything because it's impossible. Most DBs stop somewhere
> short of constraining everything because they really can't know every
> address and new ones are being created every day while others are being
> eliminated. Zip codes are nearly as annoying.
Nothing knows everything properly. When DB's competitors reach
perfection, then we can talk.
>
> What gives data meaning, I think, is what (who) uses it--and sometimes
> even they (we) get it wrong. Whether it's a person or a formula. The
> postman gives meaning to addresses when he/she delivers it to my
> address. I give meaning to the spelling of my last name. Mathematics
> gives meaning (purpose?) to operands. How is the database supposed to
> know how to correctly spell my last name? It can't "know" anything.
> Even if I told it the DB only keeps what it was told. It hasn't
> meaning. It only has a value and the DB's job is to keep it.
>
> So when we talk about semantics and how relational databases can test
> them, and that maintaining the semantic correctness is a responsibility
> of the DB, implemented via , that responsibility is supported by OO's
> concept of high cohesion.
>
> As fascinating as the search for intelligence is, it wasn't really where
> we started. But good stuff!
I was thinking more in terms of declarative versus imparative
programming. For example, we can define a GUI by storing position/and/
or cordinates and widget attributes in a database or HTML/XML (with
"on_X" event hooks when needed). It can also be done via
screenX.drawButton("Push Me") like methods. P/R designs tend to use
declarative approaches to such while OO tends to use declarative
approaches (set/gets).
Both will work. However, the advantage of declarative approaches is
that they are more siftable (query-able, report-able, etc.), more
sharable across app languages, and normalization rules are easier to
apply. There are no known systematic ways to normalize or test the
normalization of OOP methods that create references/structures that
approach what relational has. One is mostly just using behavioral
methods to create a tangled navigational structure in app RAM. It is
hard to reason about a semi-hidden navigational graph of object
pointers, reminding me of GO TO's.
OO'ers like to brag about dependency management, but don't not offer a
systematic way to manage link (object-to-object) depedency.
>
> --
> Visit <http://blogs.instreamfinancial.com/anything.php>
> to read my rants on technology and the finance industry.
-T-
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-14, 10:11 pm |
| On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 19:27:16 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
<mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>
>And what is your answer?
>
>When possible, accompanied with an answer to a related question:
>
>[do you believe that] meaning ("intelligence"?) is computable? (:-))
Well, I'm working on it, that is, my answer, which is not to say it
will be complete or even correct, but at least a coherent argument!
The thing is, until someone can present some better arguments, all we
have is these old ones, that don't work, they just kick the problem
into someone else's court.
The core of my argument is that intelligence is indeed "computable",
in that it can be realized by conventional physics, and that
computational engines can do just as good a job, just in the way that
birds fly and airplanes fly, and one is not real flight and the other
is only artificial flight. Neither is privileged, the point is you
get off the ground and arrive somewhere else.
To toss out one more element, that pretty much implies, and I would
support, that data has to "have meaning" even for computational
engines that fall well short of "intelligent". And THAT implies, or
at least is compatible with the idea that, intelligence is not a
binary thing, nor simply a stance, but something of a continuum in
however many dimensions. McCarthy (in)famously says that a bimetallic
strip in a thermostat is "intelligent, just not very". I would
quibble with that as I want to talk only about computational engines
with clearly defined programs and execution, but I would support his
idea that some of those are "intelligent, but not very".
So, to try to wrap back around to the thread title, you end up with
some kind of interdefined sets of machinery, program, execution, and
data, which together can realize something you can circle and point to
as "meaning", and which can run by itself perfectly well, even when
you aren't there, suggesting your interpretation is secondary to
whatever it is they do to present you, on demand, with that meaning.
That's all very sketchy, there's all sorts of qualification you have
to give about embedding the computer in a wider world, and such, and
people will argue about every detail, so you really want to have
something complete and coherent and with lots of footnotes before
going on about it, or at least I do! I am well aware that there are
conventional answers of different sorts to these questions, too, the
problem being that they are all nonsense, as with the original/derived
intentionality deal above.
J.
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-15, 8:05 am |
| First, thank you an elaborated answer. I wished to know your opinion
because AFAIK you have strong interest in AI.
On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 00:19:37 GMT, JXStern wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 19:27:16 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
> <mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>
>
> Well, I'm working on it, that is, my answer, which is not to say it
> will be complete or even correct, but at least a coherent argument!
>
> The thing is, until someone can present some better arguments, all we
> have is these old ones, that don't work, they just kick the problem
> into someone else's court.
Yes, but I think that there exist fundamental reasons why. (I mean, apart
from [un]intelligence of all people involved, or because of it... (:-))
> The core of my argument is that intelligence is indeed "computable",
> in that it can be realized by conventional physics,
I presume you mean Newtonian mechanics with finite accelerations, no
quantum effects etc. I.e. a Turing machine with finite tape.
> and that
> computational engines can do just as good a job, just in the way that
> birds fly and airplanes fly, and one is not real flight and the other
> is only artificial flight. Neither is privileged, the point is you
> get off the ground and arrive somewhere else.
This is not same. To clarify it, let us consider a related question. Is
[physical] Universe computable? I believe that many parts of modern physics
aren't computable. This means that there is no equivalence between two.
That in turn suggests existence of some incomputable elements. Now the
question is, can these elements play a sufficient role in intelligence? If
they do, then intelligence is incomputable, though, possibly, constructible
by assembling black boxes.
> To toss out one more element, that pretty much implies, and I would
> support, that data has to "have meaning" even for computational
> engines that fall well short of "intelligent". And THAT implies, or
> at least is compatible with the idea that, intelligence is not a
> binary thing, nor simply a stance, but something of a continuum in
> however many dimensions. McCarthy (in)famously says that a bimetallic
> strip in a thermostat is "intelligent, just not very". I would
> quibble with that as I want to talk only about computational engines
> with clearly defined programs and execution, but I would support his
> idea that some of those are "intelligent, but not very".
>
> So, to try to wrap back around to the thread title, you end up with
> some kind of interdefined sets of machinery, program, execution, and
> data, which together can realize something you can circle and point to
> as "meaning", and which can run by itself perfectly well, even when
> you aren't there, suggesting your interpretation is secondary to
> whatever it is they do to present you, on demand, with that meaning.
Oh, material meanings, is it what you are heading for? My counter argument
is that once you made a meaning self-sustainable, enclosed in a working
machine, you would immediately lose it, because you were no more a part of
the system. What meaning does have thermodynamics? It definitely works
without you and me.
But let's consider it pragmatically. Let any physical system had a meaning.
[Some are more meaningful than others, to paraphrase Orwell] Can this
meaning be understood from outside? [*] I think it is quite obvious that
"understanding" (whatever definition we gave it) is itself incomputable.
Now, you are in an uncomfortable position. Either we themselves are
computable but are incapable to determine [real, objective, material]
meanings, and thus meanings don't exist for us, or else we can determine
meanings but are incomputable themselves.
---------
* Here is another difficult question for you. When one physical system
understands another physical system, does the meaning of the former system
change? If it does then how the meaning of the former system could be its
function [=real, objective, material]?
----------
> That's all very sketchy, there's all sorts of qualification you have
> to give about embedding the computer in a wider world, and such, and
> people will argue about every detail, so you really want to have
> something complete and coherent and with lots of footnotes before
> going on about it, or at least I do! I am well aware that there are
> conventional answers of different sorts to these questions, too, the
> problem being that they are all nonsense, as with the original/derived
> intentionality deal above.
I agree that resorting to incomputability is basically hand waving. Also,
there seems to be problems with hyper computations, such as inconsistencies
and paradoxes. I don't know how to avoid them. But the alternative does not
look much promising either.
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-15, 7:08 pm |
| On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 11:41:11 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
<mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>First, thank you an elaborated answer. I wished to know your opinion
>because AFAIK you have strong interest in AI.
Thanks for asking! I love to talk about it, of course, but at this
point still only in small pieces.
>
>On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 00:19:37 GMT, JXStern wrote:
>
>
>Yes, but I think that there exist fundamental reasons why. (I mean, apart
>from [un]intelligence of all people involved, or because of it... (:-))
I think the only reason why, is we haven't got our hands on it yet. I
think it will turn out to be rather simple. That is, like humans had
fire for a hundred thousand years, before they got a decent
understanding of it. Even today, I don't believe we have a *full*
understanding of fire! Luckily, it seems we don't *need* a full
understanding to use it quite widely!
>
>I presume you mean Newtonian mechanics with finite accelerations, no
>quantum effects etc. I.e. a Turing machine with finite tape.
More like an Intel machine with finite RAM and disk, but yes. I will
state that if you can't do it with a modern $1,000 workstation, then
I'm simply wrong about computability. I think the required hardware
to compute a human-level of intelligence is probably much smaller.
>
>
>This is not same. To clarify it, let us consider a related question. Is
>[physical] Universe computable?
Does the universe have to be computable for your browser to work?
>I believe that many parts of modern physics
>aren't computable. This means that there is no equivalence between two.
>That in turn suggests existence of some incomputable elements. Now the
>question is, can these elements play a sufficient role in intelligence? If
>they do, then intelligence is incomputable, though, possibly, constructible
>by assembling black boxes.
I'm sure there are parts of the universe that are uncomputable, but
fortunately we have no interest in computing them!
>
>Oh, material meanings, is it what you are heading for? My counter argument
>is that once you made a meaning self-sustainable, enclosed in a working
>machine, you would immediately lose it, because you were no more a part of
>the system. What meaning does have thermodynamics? It definitely works
>without you and me.
There are some issues of methodological solipcism and
intersubjectivity and normativity that need to be addressed, but NO
quantum/observer or Godelian/consistency, these are both complete red
herrings.
>But let's consider it pragmatically. Let any physical system had a meaning.
I can't follow any argument that starts this generally.
I say let us discuss only digital electronic computers, and the
meaning that some bag of bits might have.
>[Some are more meaningful than others, to paraphrase Orwell]
Quite.
> Can this
>meaning be understood from outside? [*]
I say this bag of bits means "Sally's dog" to my program, and to me,
and to George, the part-time programmer who comes in Thursdays to help
out.
>I think it is quite obvious that
>"understanding" (whatever definition we gave it) is itself incomputable.
I don't see how you got that.
But it's an old problem, do you know Wittgenstein's parable of the
"beetle in a box"? The ancient question of shared qualia - is your
"red" the "same" as my "red"? Is your pain the "same" as my pain?
These are not really issues of computability, these are metaphysical
questions, which just might be ANSWERED by examples from computation!
>Now, you are in an uncomfortable position. Either we themselves are
>computable but are incapable to determine [real, objective, material]
>meanings, and thus meanings don't exist for us, or else we can determine
>meanings but are incomputable themselves.
Yes, you are off the rails here.
>---------
>* Here is another difficult question for you. When one physical system
>understands another physical system, does the meaning of the former system
>change?
No. Why should it? The first doesn't even "know" that I understand.
it. Light reflected off it and hit my eyes giving my brain some stuff
to work with, and the "understanding" is, or isn't, all in my head,
and doesn't much show for the first system to detect, though if it did
detect it, THEN the first system might change, but only because *it*
suddenly knew something new about me!
>If it does then how the meaning of the former system could be its
>function [=real, objective, material]?
You are apparently thinking there is some global perspective from
which total meaning in the universe is summed. This is not the case.
"Meaning" is what an individual makes of it. What X means to you is
probably not exactly what X means to me, and neither of us is more or
less correct than the other. Indeed, there is probably no way to even
measure the difference, or even to define what should be measured.
These bits make a picture of a dog on my computer screen, when I send
you something, I don't send you my bits, I send you a copy of them (I
still have mine, after all!), and when your computer displays your
copy of the bits on your screen, it is very similar, and there is
nothing very mysterious about that, but in my theoretical structure, I
do not claim it is the "same" in any absolute sense, though it is
often the "same" in some good-enough sense.
>----------
>
>I agree that resorting to incomputability is basically hand waving.
It's a valid argument ... that turns out to be wrong, or more
precisely, irrelevant.
>Also,
>there seems to be problems with hyper computations, such as inconsistencies
>and paradoxes. I don't know how to avoid them.
I'm sure they're fun, but irrelevant to "meaning".
>But the alternative does not
>look much promising either.
Looks fine to me, I find the historical gloominess mildly amusing, and
mostly holdovers from 19th century or classic Gr doctrines long
since abandoned in the hard sciences.
Josh
| |
| Eliot Miranda 2007-04-15, 7:08 pm |
| topmind wrote:
> Eliot Miranda wrote:
>
> "Meaning" is relative. It is like asking if pi exists.
All meaning is grounded in physical existence. There is no meaning in
the void. Meaning arises from computation, and computation arises from
physical activity (the movement of electrons in synapses, and
transistors, the movement of cogs in Babbage's engine, etc). The
abstract models of computation within which one can demonstrate
computational equivalences are themselves rooted within physical
reality, so the demonstrations themselves don't lift meaning above
physical reality.
Pi doesn't exist except within systems that can hold the concept of
ratio. And that means it exists inside computational entities capable
of conceptual thought. These entities exist (us at the very least),
therefore Pi exists. But Pi doesn't exist outside of thought and so
doesn't exist outside of the physical Universe.
Much more difficult is defining when computation rises to the level of
thought.
>
> I've found a tin-foil hat is helpful against that :-)
>
>
> -T-
>
--
The surest sign that intelligent life exists elsewhere in Calvin &
the universe is that none of it has tried to contact us. Hobbes.
--
Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-16, 8:07 am |
| On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 15:59:10 GMT, JXStern wrote:
> I think the only reason why, is we haven't got our hands on it yet. I
> think it will turn out to be rather simple. That is, like humans had
> fire for a hundred thousand years, before they got a decent
> understanding of it.
Well, in that sense we already have it. Any two healthy individuals of
different sexes can easily create an intelligent system knowing nothing
about computations...
> Even today, I don't believe we have a *full*
> understanding of fire! Luckily, it seems we don't *need* a full
> understanding to use it quite widely!
E.g. let's take a NN, feed it with moving images, sound, attach some
actuators and in 18 years it will become intelligent by itself?
I think this is also a form of hand waving. Because the level of
understanding necessary for any technology to become really a technology is
possible to define. Our technology of fire is good enough to produce safe
Zippo lighters. We are nothing close to any comparable level for the
technology of intelligence.
> More like an Intel machine with finite RAM and disk, but yes. I will
> state that if you can't do it with a modern $1,000 workstation, then
> I'm simply wrong about computability. I think the required hardware
> to compute a human-level of intelligence is probably much smaller.
Wow! Don't you afraid of being compared with alchemists longing for
transmutations? Even if they knew about protons and electrons, chemistry
just cannot make gold out of lead.
Hmm, what would it take to try out all possible programs fitting into 2GB
memory? That could directly prove your claim. Much better than wasting
resources for SETI@home! (:-))
>
> Does the universe have to be computable for your browser to work?
No because browser is unaware of existence of the universe. Yet any
intelligent person is. Or, being more accurate, a number of intelligent
persons in 4000 years could become aware of the universe. Can you say the
same about a band of browsers?
> I'm sure there are parts of the universe that are uncomputable, but
> fortunately we have no interest in computing them!
That's a very strong statement. I wouldn't be so sure. Even our trivial
unintelligent programs use incomputable elements like clocks and random
generators. We just don't know what is required to compute intelligence.
> I say let us discuss only digital electronic computers, and the
> meaning that some bag of bits might have.
>
>
> Quite.
>
>
> I say this bag of bits means "Sally's dog" to my program, and to me,
> and to George, the part-time programmer who comes in Thursdays to help
> out.
OK, but this would involve you and George. So it is not clear how are you
going to reduce the meaning to solely the bag of bits [the data]. My note
was just a suggestion of a sort of "Mach's principle" for meanings, which
could save your concept. The universe determines the meanings, which lets
somebody to understand the bag in your absence, George have decided to
become barber being afraid of the coming invasion silicon programmers... To
me the universe defining some platonic meanings is rubbish, but I am
curious how are you going to avoid such traps.
>
> I don't see how you got that.
Don't we understand some incomputable things?
> But it's an old problem, do you know Wittgenstein's parable of the
> "beetle in a box"? The ancient question of shared qualia - is your
> "red" the "same" as my "red"? Is your pain the "same" as my pain?
> These are not really issues of computability, these are metaphysical
> questions, which just might be ANSWERED by examples from computation!
But it still a "learning with a teacher." The teacher knows the meanings.
>
> You are apparently thinking there is some global perspective from
> which total meaning in the universe is summed.
No I don't. I tried to extrapolate.
> This is not the case.
> "Meaning" is what an individual makes of it.
Ah, that brings us back to the question what is the meaning of a bag of
bits in absence of that unfortunate individual? The point I would argue is
that meaning does not exist, because it changes with the observer. In
absence of observers there is no meaning.
> What X means to you is
> probably not exactly what X means to me, and neither of us is more or
> less correct than the other. Indeed, there is probably no way to even
> measure the difference, or even to define what should be measured.
> These bits make a picture of a dog on my computer screen, when I send
> you something, I don't send you my bits, I send you a copy of them (I
> still have mine, after all!), and when your computer displays your
> copy of the bits on your screen, it is very similar, and there is
> nothing very mysterious about that, but in my theoretical structure, I
> do not claim it is the "same" in any absolute sense, though it is
> often the "same" in some good-enough sense.
OK, but if we can neither define nor measure it, how are we going to create
an artificial system which would recognize pictures of dogs? Not even
concrete dogs, neither you nor me were created for just that purpose. We
posses an ability to invent and communicate [non-existing! (:-))] meanings.
>
> It's a valid argument ... that turns out to be wrong, or more
> precisely, irrelevant.
That is a quite pessimistic view. You accept that there are doors we are
not allowed to look behind.
Or can a computable intelligence create an incomputable one? (I mean, any
finite set of computable things is itself computable and the process of
creation is other [computable] things is also computable. They (we) cannot
do anything incomputable. No any magic.)
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| Alexandr Savinov 2007-04-16, 8:07 am |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov schrieb:
> On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 17:02:39 GMT, JXStern wrote:
>
>
> And what is your answer?
>
> When possible, accompanied with an answer to a related question:
>
> [do you believe that] meaning ("intelligence"?) is computable? (:-))
Intelligence can be thought of as degree of organization or complexity.
If one system is more organized (more complex) than it is smarter or
more intelligent than the other. In particular, it should win if they
compete for something.
As a consequence, intelligent system may have any nature including
computational. In other words, there is no argument against having a
highly intelligent computational system.
However, the main point is that less intelligent system is not able to
perceive a more intelligent system. Simpler speaking, stupid system will
never meet (in its opinion) a smarter system just because all other
systems for this one will have either the same or less organization. For
a monkey all people are just other monkeys (may be more aggressive and
strong but with the same or less intelligence). A less intelligent
system simply has too small state space for perceiving a more
intelligent system and hence it projects more complex and rich space
into its smaller space.
Conclusion. Even if more intelligent systems exist or can be built we
will be unaware of them. For example, if intelligence arises in the
global network (actually, it may well be already there) then we will not
be able to understand that fact just because this system is smarter and
more organized. So we can create artificial intelligence but we are not
able to fix the moment of its appearance and even confirm the fact that
it really exists. The only thing we can do is to speculate about
something out there that may be smarter than we are.
--
http://conceptoriented.com
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-16, 8:08 am |
| On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 11:13:24 +0200, Alexandr Savinov wrote:
> Dmitry A. Kazakov schrieb:
>
> Intelligence can be thought of as degree of organization or complexity.
> If one system is more organized (more complex) than it is smarter or
> more intelligent than the other. In particular, it should win if they
> compete for something.
I don't think this is true. Depending on how you define complexity and
organization, number of states? predictability of transitions? Nothing of
those looks like a sufficient condition of intelligence.
> As a consequence, intelligent system may have any nature including
> computational. In other words, there is no argument against having a
> highly intelligent computational system.
That would be a proof by construction. You take a lot of used beer cans and
create an intelligent system out of them. Fine, but first nobody managed
that so far, and secondly, nobody knows how to determine if a given pile of
cans is intelligent, i.e. Turing Test etc. You refer to that below:
> However, the main point is that less intelligent system is not able to
> perceive a more intelligent system. Simpler speaking, stupid system will
> never meet (in its opinion) a smarter system just because all other
> systems for this one will have either the same or less organization. For
> a monkey all people are just other monkeys (may be more aggressive and
> strong but with the same or less intelligence). A less intelligent
> system simply has too small state space for perceiving a more
> intelligent system and hence it projects more complex and rich space
> into its smaller space.
>
> Conclusion. Even if more intelligent systems exist or can be built we
> will be unaware of them.
What would their existence mean for us then?
> For example, if intelligence arises in the
> global network (actually, it may well be already there) then we will not
> be able to understand that fact just because this system is smarter and
> more organized. So we can create artificial intelligence but we are not
> able to fix the moment of its appearance and even confirm the fact that
> it really exists. The only thing we can do is to speculate about
> something out there that may be smarter than we are.
What you describe is emerging an intelligent system in the result of some
unconscious activity. This is not what I understand under creating
intelligent systems. Creating things means possessing a technology of
engineering and production of, with desired properties, predictable outcome
and reasonable chances of success.
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| Alexandr Savinov 2007-04-16, 7:07 pm |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov schrieb:
> On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 11:13:24 +0200, Alexandr Savinov wrote:
>
>
>
> I don't think this is true. Depending on how you define complexity and
> organization, number of states? predictability of transitions? Nothing of
> those looks like a sufficient condition of intelligence.
Actually, I am using terms "intelligent", "complex", "well organized" as
synonyms. One measure of complexity (intelligence) might be quantity of
information. One million of beer cans is not very informative - it could
be compressed into very small zip-archive. A more intelligent system
contains more information. But of course, the issue not so simple and I
understand that this criterion is rather shallow.
>
> That would be a proof by construction. You take a lot of used beer cans and
> create an intelligent system out of them. Fine, but first nobody managed
> that so far, and secondly, nobody knows how to determine if a given pile of
> cans is intelligent, i.e. Turing Test etc. You refer to that below:
Obviously, a set of cans is not a complex system just as a set of
unrelated objects in a program. We need connections, interactivity and
other well known properties of a complex system. But if these beer cans
were appropriately connected then nothing would prevent them from
behaving like an intelligent system. However, below I describe why such
a system cannot be created by humans.
>
> What would their existence mean for us then?
If more intelligent system would be interested in us then we would feel
like cows in a farm. Indeed, cows should be quite happy with their life
because they have everything they need. But what is more interesting,
they probably "think" that this life is their own achievement. (Frankly,
I think that our society is very similar to such a farm.)
If more intelligent system is not very interested in us then we would
live as usual without any mutual influence (like insects). We might be a
goal for some research activity but not more.
>
> What you describe is emerging an intelligent system in the result of some
> unconscious activity. This is not what I understand under creating
> intelligent systems. Creating things means possessing a technology of
> engineering and production of, with desired properties, predictable outcome
> and reasonable chances of success.
Having a technology for creating a thing of some complexity
(intelligence) assumes that tools and the person doing that has at least
the same complexity. In other words, a system can create systems with
the same or less complexity (intelligence). Indeed, in order to build a
house, this house must be built in our head and then we need to build
appropriate tools. So what we create corresponds to our own complexity
and it is not possible to create more complex thing than we are
themselves. If it is so, then it is not possible to consciously create
an intelligent system (smarter than its creator). But intelligent system
can arise as a result of its own evolution, i.e., due to some other laws
and partially because of the activity of existing systems and the
existing environment stack (biosphere etc.) In other words, intelligence
can appear at the top of the existing organization stack where previous
elements are unaware of the next elements. If we assume that we can
create a more intelligent system then the consequence would be that
monkeys created humans.
By an intelligent system you probably understand simulation of
intelligence by a tool or subsystem like chess playing or
question-answer systems. It of course requires a kind of intelligence
for its behavior to look smart and human-like. But I mean something more
fundamental, i.e., something that may exist by itself, has its own goals
etc.
--
http://conceptoriented.com
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-16, 7:07 pm |
| On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 11:08:31 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
<mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 15:59:10 GMT, JXStern wrote:
>
>
>Well, in that sense we already have it. Any two healthy individuals of
>different sexes can easily create an intelligent system knowing nothing
>about computations...
And sometimes it's more fun to try than to succeed, but let's not lose
focus here. (Heh-heh, he said 'focus'). We're talking about
"meaning" and only secondarily "intelligence". I'm claiming that you
need and have meaning even for ordinary computer programs. IF that is
true, then the jump from ordinary programs to "intelligent" programs -
may be no jump at all. Anyway, I want to come at the problem from the
other side, and understand what it is even in a dumb program, that
realizes "meaning".
>
>E.g. let's take a NN, feed it with moving images, sound, attach some
>actuators and in 18 years it will become intelligent by itself?
I certainly did not say that.
>I think this is also a form of hand waving. Because the level of
>understanding necessary for any technology to become really a technology is
>possible to define. Our technology of fire is good enough to produce safe
>Zippo lighters. We are nothing close to any comparable level for the
>technology of intelligence.
As before, McCarthy has always said otherwise, and with a few quibbles
I agree with him, that ordinary computer programs are the right sort
of mechanisms, and any program that works is already somewhere well up
the scale of intelligence. How far? I don't know - if a rock is zero
and Britney Spears is 100, then maybe Internet Explorer 6.0 is ...
hey, 6.0, why not? Of course, we have the old problem of what is
intelligent? Is a dog intelligent? A worm? A paramecium?
>
>Wow! Don't you afraid of being compared with alchemists longing for
>transmutations? Even if they knew about protons and electrons, chemistry
>just cannot make gold out of lead.
Physics can.
Anyway, that's their problem. I don't need to transmute anything,
Intel has done the chemistry and physics for me, Mssrs. Volta and
Ampere have provided the juice, and all that's left is a little
fiddling. If it's magic to you, I'm even more proud of myself! "Any
sufficiently advanced technology", and all that.
>Hmm, what would it take to try out all possible programs fitting into 2GB
>memory? That could directly prove your claim. Much better than wasting
>resources for SETI@home! (:-))
Um, do the math on that. All the programs fitting into even 1mb is
prohibitive. Nobody is trying to evolve or discover payroll programs
or word processors, even though the concept is out there. OTOH, given
some development groups, ... maybe they should!
>
>No because browser is unaware of existence of the universe. Yet any
>intelligent person is.
One bit: bAwareOfUniverse = True. There y'go!
>Or, being more accurate, a number of intelligent
>persons in 4000 years could become aware of the universe. Can you say the
>same about a band of browsers?
Maybe it's not *quite* as simple as above, but pretty nearly.
>
>That's a very strong statement.
Thank you.
>I wouldn't be so sure.
Trust me. :)
> Even our trivial
>unintelligent programs use incomputable elements like clocks and random
>generators.
All I said is, I don't need to compute the clock.
>We just don't know what is required to compute intelligence.
To the contrary, we're pretty certain we do know, we just don't have
an empirical proof. What we could use, however, is a LOT more clarity
on just what the issues are and the coherent arguments and positions
should be. We are not likely to trip across that working program,
until we get a lot more basic principles mapped out.
>
>OK, but this would involve you and George. So it is not clear how are you
>going to reduce the meaning to solely the bag of bits [the data]. My note
>was just a suggestion of a sort of "Mach's principle" for meanings, which
>could save your concept. The universe determines the meanings, which lets
>somebody to understand the bag in your absence, George have decided to
>become barber being afraid of the coming invasion silicon programmers... To
>me the universe defining some platonic meanings is rubbish, but I am
>curious how are you going to avoid such traps.
Yes, my meaning involves me, George's meaning involves George, and my
program's meaning involves my program. Each of "us" has its own
physical subtrate. There is no meaning without the substrate. There
are no bits without the substrate! Mach's principle and holism are
exactly what one must avoid - holism is always problematic. You don't
use it in writing ordinary programs, or if you do, then just keep on
using it the same way to write intelligent programs. Whatever.
>
>Don't we understand some incomputable things?
Doesn't matter.
There are plenty of computable things I do not understand, but use
anyway. I don't know how to bake a cake, but it's still delicious and
fattening. The universe is very accomodating that way. I see no
issues at all.
NB - in fact, I've just been reading Wittgenstein's writing on
mathematics. He is famously skeptical that we really know how to
produce an infinite, or even finite, sequence of numbers, like 2, 4,
6, 8, ... he says it's all just consensus, not "knowledge". He became
his own kind of finitist after 1928, rejecting Cantor. He was
famously skeptical that Godel's theorem was valid. He was famously
skeptical that Turing had said anything interesting. Yet he made the
same mistake you (and most others) make, about whether one can "know"
something complex by its handle, like Godel "knowing" the truth of his
theorem tho it is unprovable from within. Remnant Platonism. If you
choose to add an axiom to your system, "X is true", then what you know
is that "I believe that X is true", your mere statement of it does not
magically give you true understanding of X.
Yes, of course this is very argumentative, ... but you asked.
>
>But it still a "learning with a teacher." The teacher knows the meanings.
No, none of the above is "learning with a teacher".
>
>No I don't. I tried to extrapolate.
OK, then you lost me here.
>
>Ah, that brings us back to the question what is the meaning of a bag of
>bits in absence of that unfortunate individual? The point I would argue is
>that meaning does not exist, because it changes with the observer. In
>absence of observers there is no meaning.
Just change the word from "observer" with its unfortunate QM
connotations, use the word "agent" instead, and we're pretty much in
agreement. The question has always been, what is a valid agent?
Heck, that's really the valid question in QM, too, but linking the two
problems is beyond me, I'll assume these are two separate but somewhat
parallel questions.
>
>OK, but if we can neither define nor measure it, how are we going to create
>an artificial system which would recognize pictures of dogs? Not even
>concrete dogs, neither you nor me were created for just that purpose. We
>posses an ability to invent and communicate [non-existing! (:-))] meanings.
We do that sort of thing all day long.
The answer is, you do your best, and often enough that is enough! Or
else you find another line of work.
>
>That is a quite pessimistic view. You accept that there are doors we are
>not allowed to look behind.
Um, we're all garbled up here.
Chess may be formally "incomputable" before the universe dissolves,
but we all live our lives anyway, and even play some chess.
Meaning is just about what *is* computable, and that turns out to be
plenty.
>Or can a computable intelligence create an incomputable one? (I mean, any
>finite set of computable things is itself computable and the process of
>creation is other [computable] things is also computable. They (we) cannot
>do anything incomputable. No any magic.)
I doubt there is such a thing as an incomputable intelligence, that
would indeed be magic.
Josh
| |
| topmind 2007-04-16, 7:08 pm |
|
Eliot Miranda wrote:
> topmind wrote:
>
> All meaning is grounded in physical existence.
"Grounded" is too strong a word IMO. It may be required for final
manifestation, but that does not mean it is "grounded" in it, but
merely that such is a *necessary requirement*, but not necessarily the
most "important" issue. (Oh oh, a metaphysical battle over the
meaning of "importance" will now ensue.) See the tax analogy later on.
Think of it this way: our universe may be a simulation of a simulation
of a simulation, and we may not know the difference. Maybe at the
highest level there is physical hardware, but it is not (and cannot so
far) be our concern.
When you are programming in Smalltalk or PHP, are you really concerned
with the processes inside your Intel or AMD processor to execute your
code (other than knowing that there are performance limitations)?
> There is no meaning in
> the void. Meaning arises from computation, and computation arises from
> physical activity (the movement of electrons in synapses, and
> transistors, the movement of cogs in Babbage's engine, etc). The
> abstract models of computation within which one can demonstrate
> computational equivalences are themselves rooted within physical
> reality, so the demonstrations themselves don't lift meaning above
> physical reality.
>
> Pi doesn't exist except within systems that can hold the concept of
> ratio. And that means it exists inside computational entities capable
> of conceptual thought. These entities exist (us at the very least),
> therefore Pi exists. But Pi doesn't exist outside of thought and so
> doesn't exist outside of the physical Universe.
Again, a physical universe may be necessary for "final output", but it
is not something we are *conceptually* bound to use it. Abstractions
eventually require concrete implementation to be useable for real
work, but that is a mere detail, a "tax" on abstraction that we live
with. Taxes are necessary for a business (unless you are
Haliburton :-), but that does not mean that taxes are the important
part of your business. They are simply a cost of doing business. A
final concreteness of some kind is the cost (tax) of using
abstractions like pi, math, or software.
[color=darkred]
>
> Much more difficult is defining when computation rises to the level of
> thought.
>
>
Side note: I've proposed that a SETI-like search for ET messages/
artifacts in DNA may be warranted. Sure, it is a long-shot, but so is
SETI. And unlike SETI, does not require any new hardware (antennas)
once the DNA codons are available from other purposes (reuse). Thus,
lower probabability, but also lower expenses, balancing it out. Hell,
if its cheap to test for unicorns and bigfoot, why not? However, when
it was pointed out that it was "ID like", people went nuts and poo-
pooed the idea and started calling me nasty names. It went from an
intellectual curiousity to being in the middle of the evo-vs-create
debates.
[color=darkred]
-T-
| |
| topmind 2007-04-16, 7:08 pm |
|
Alexandr Savinov wrote:
> Dmitry A. Kazakov schrieb:
>
> Actually, I am using terms "intelligent", "complex", "well organized" as
> synonyms. One measure of complexity (intelligence) might be quantity of
> information. One million of beer cans is not very informative - it could
> be compressed into very small zip-archive. A more intelligent system
> contains more information. But of course, the issue not so simple and I
> understand that this criterion is rather shallow.
>
>
> Obviously, a set of cans is not a complex system just as a set of
> unrelated objects in a program. We need connections, interactivity and
> other well known properties of a complex system. But if these beer cans
> were appropriately connected then nothing would prevent them from
> behaving like an intelligent system. However, below I describe why such
> a system cannot be created by humans.
A computer built out of beer cans can be Turing Complete. It may be
slow as hell, but given enough time could in thoery calculate anything
a Cray can. There is a university that made a Tinkertoy computer,
which is still on display IIRC.
>
>
> If more intelligent system would be interested in us then we would feel
> like cows in a farm. Indeed, cows should be quite happy with their life
> because they have everything they need. But what is more interesting,
> they probably "think" that this life is their own achievement. (Frankly,
> I think that our society is very similar to such a farm.)
Mooo
>
> If more intelligent system is not very interested in us then we would
> live as usual without any mutual influence (like insects). We might be a
> goal for some research activity but not more.
>
>
> Having a technology for creating a thing of some complexity
> (intelligence) assumes that tools and the person doing that has at least
> the same complexity. In other words, a system can create systems with
> the same or less complexity (intelligence).
Are you saying that we couldn't build a computer/bot smarter than us
(without using evolution such as genetic algs.)? I don't think there
is any proven law that says this.
> Indeed, in order to build a
> house, this house must be built in our head and then we need to build
> appropriate tools. So what we create corresponds to our own complexity
> and it is not possible to create more complex thing than we are
> themselves. If it is so, then it is not possible to consciously create
> an intelligent system (smarter than its creator). But intelligent system
> can arise as a result of its own evolution, i.e., due to some other laws
> and partially because of the activity of existing systems and the
> existing environment stack (biosphere etc.) In other words, intelligence
> can appear at the top of the existing organization stack where previous
> elements are unaware of the next elements. If we assume that we can
> create a more intelligent system then the consequence would be that
> monkeys created humans.
So *only* evolution can create intelligence? This is only speculation.
I would tend to disagree. If we figured out how the brain worked, I
think we could refine the principles it is based on and improve it.
Most human brain "computation" is devoted to social, sexual, and
emotional issues. If we could remove or reduce these, then we could
make a more effecient brain, perhaps one capable of improving itself,
creating a self-feeding boom in intelligence expansion. Plus, we can
add more capacity per artificial brain than the biological one is
capable of.
>
> By an intelligent system you probably understand simulation of
> intelligence by a tool or subsystem like chess playing or
> question-answer systems. It of course requires a kind of intelligence
> for its behavior to look smart and human-like. But I mean something more
> fundamental, i.e., something that may exist by itself, has its own goals
> etc.
>
> --
> http://conceptoriented.com
-T-
| |
| Eliot Miranda 2007-04-16, 7:08 pm |
| topmind wrote:
> Eliot Miranda wrote:
>
> "Grounded" is too strong a word IMO. It may be required for final
> manifestation, but that does not mean it is "grounded" in it, but
> merely that such is a *necessary requirement*, but not necessarily the
> most "important" issue. (Oh oh, a metaphysical battle over the
> meaning of "importance" will now ensue.) See the tax analogy later on.
"Grounded" is an excellent term, referring as t does to being based in a
material reality. In fact a material Universe is necessary and
sufficient for the exstence of meaning. No one *can* demonstrate that
meaning exists anywhere else. They can present an abstract system in
which meaning exists, btu that presentation can only happen within the
context of a material reality (even if upon an infinite tower of
simulations). A metacircular interpreter can bootstrap itself within
itself only because underneath it is mechanism providing execution
primitives. Without the mechanism the metacircularity collapses. You
can think of it existing in the abstract, but it can't think of itself
in the abstract; it needs the underlying hardware. if you're the one
simulating it then you're the underlying hardware.
> Think of it this way: our universe may be a simulation of a simulation
> of a simulation, and we may not know the difference. Maybe at the
> highest level there is physical hardware, but it is not (and cannot so
> far) be our concern.
Whether we can tell whether we're a simulation or not, you take as a
given that eventually that tower of simulations terminates in real
hardware (a physical universe). That's the point. The ardware
(physics) comes before meaning.
> When you are programming in Smalltalk or PHP, are you really concerned
> with the processes inside your Intel or AMD processor to execute your
> code (other than knowing that there are performance limitations)?
Whether I can abstract away from hardware when reasoning about a program
or not doesn't change the fact that its my physical brain that does the
reasoning and not some Platonic abstraction.
--
Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
| |
| topmind 2007-04-16, 7:08 pm |
|
Eliot Miranda wrote:
> topmind wrote:
>
> "Grounded" is an excellent term, referring as t does to being based in a
> material reality. In fact a material Universe is necessary and
> sufficient for the exstence of meaning. No one *can* demonstrate that
> meaning exists anywhere else. They can present an abstract system in
> which meaning exists, btu that presentation can only happen within the
> context of a material reality (even if upon an infinite tower of
> simulations).
You seem to be confusing "necessary" and "most important". Yes, a
physical resting place is (eventually) needed for the representation,
but again that is merely an "existence tax" paid by everything with a
tangable representation.
> A metacircular interpreter can bootstrap itself within
> itself only because underneath it is mechanism providing execution
> primitives. Without the mechanism the metacircularity collapses. You
> can think of it existing in the abstract, but it can't think of itself
> in the abstract; it needs the underlying hardware. if you're the one
> simulating it then you're the underlying hardware.
>
>
> Whether we can tell whether we're a simulation or not, you take as a
> given that eventually that tower of simulations terminates in real
> hardware (a physical universe). That's the point. The ardware
> (physics) comes before meaning.
But your "eventually" can be so far removed such as to not be a
controllable or "care-able" issue for the beings doing the abstracting
in the lowest-level universe chain. The "eventually" can approach
infinity such that our control over it (relavancy to us) approaches
zero such that we can assume it is zero in our analysis of it. If the
level was changed from say 5 deep to 5,000,000 deep, the issues at our
level would not change from our perspective. And since infinity levels
would be equivalent of no levels (all virtual), a change from
5,000,000 deep to infinity deep would not change anything for us
meaning that it is the *same* with or without from our perspective.
>
>
> Whether I can abstract away from hardware when reasoning about a program
> or not doesn't change the fact that its my physical brain that does the
> reasoning and not some Platonic abstraction.
How do you know your "physical" brain is not really a simulation in
God's Pentium? You cannot know for sure, but it probably does not
change the issue either way.
>
> --
> Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
-T-
| |
| Eliot Miranda 2007-04-16, 7:08 pm |
| topmind wrote:
> Eliot Miranda wrote:
>
> You seem to be confusing "necessary" and "most important". Yes, a
> physical resting place is (eventually) needed for the representation,
> but again that is merely an "existence tax" paid by everything with a
> tangable representation.
You seem to be  . Show me *any* computation not grounded in
physics. And btw its "tangible".
>
>
> But your "eventually" can be so far removed such as to not be a
> controllable or "care-able" issue for the beings doing the abstracting
> in the lowest-level universe chain. The "eventually" can approach
> infinity such that our control over it (relavancy to us) approaches
> zero such that we can assume it is zero in our analysis of it. If the
> level was changed from say 5 deep to 5,000,000 deep, the issues at our
> level would not change from our perspective. And since infinity levels
> would be equivalent of no levels (all virtual), a change from
> 5,000,000 deep to infinity deep would not change anything for us
> meaning that it is the *same* with or without from our perspective.
Not so. At each level of the simulation the computation depends on the
existence of the (possibly simulated) hardware immediately below it.
The number of levels doesn't reduce the direct dependence of the
computation (simulated or otherwise) on the computing machinery
performing that computation.
>
> How do you know your "physical" brain is not really a simulation in
> God's Pentium? You cannot know for sure, but it probably does not
> change the issue either way.
Exactly. Even if I am a simulation the computation simulating me is
happening somewhere somehow.
But enough already. You've brought up God. Time to bow out.
--
Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
| |
| topmind 2007-04-16, 10:06 pm |
|
Eliot Miranda wrote:
> topmind wrote:
>
> You seem to be . Show me *any* computation not grounded in
> physics. And btw its "tangible".
A Star Trek game where time can run backwards. Also, simulations of
universes with different constants have been done by researchers to
explore the Anthropic Principle.
Or do you mean not influenced in any way by our universe. That may be
a tall order because it is hard to measure influence (bias) of any
phoney world created in math.
>
>
> Not so. At each level of the simulation the computation depends on the
> existence of the (possibly simulated) hardware immediately below it.
> The number of levels doesn't reduce the direct dependence of the
> computation (simulated or otherwise) on the computing machinery
> performing that computation.
Being dependent on reality and dependent on computation are not
necessarily the same thing. Also, we have to be clear whether we are
equating "meaning" with reality or computation. Does compution give
data meaning or reality or both or neither? When I type in an HTML tag
such as "<p>", I don't really care how it is computed (implimented).
The "meaning" from my standpoint is usually about marking a paragraph,
not what the browser does underneath the covers.
I might not even "run" it; it may be a merely note to myself to remind
me later where a paragraph starts. Does that mean it does not have
"meaning" until I run it through a browser?
>
>
> Exactly. Even if I am a simulation the computation simulating me is
> happening somewhere somehow.
>
> But enough already. You've brought up God. Time to bow out.
God is Pentium. Pentium is God. Zardoz is Good :-)
Maybe the simulations can be recursive such that A simulates B which
simulates C which simulates A. The laws of physics outside of this
universe may allow it. It is sort of analogous to God going back in
time to create himself in order to avoid the need for an original
creator. Forward-only timelines may only be a feature of our universe/
simulation.
> --
> Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
-T-
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-17, 8:07 am |
| On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 15:57:59 GMT, JXStern wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 11:08:31 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
> <mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>
>
> And sometimes it's more fun to try than to succeed, but let's not lose
> focus here. (Heh-heh, he said 'focus'). We're talking about
> "meaning" and only secondarily "intelligence". I'm claiming that you
> need and have meaning even for ordinary computer programs. IF that is
> true, then the jump from ordinary programs to "intelligent" programs -
> may be no jump at all.
Yes, if it were true. However it still tells nothing about jumps. An
"intelligent meaning" could be too large for any program, e.g.
incomputable. But I agree that it would be a secondary question then.
> Anyway, I want to come at the problem from the
> other side, and understand what it is even in a dumb program, that
> realizes "meaning".
Nice, but how to do it? I asked about intelligence only because in my view
the meaning is a [by-]product of an intelligent system. The reason why I
think so, is that meaning often refers to the things incomputable for the
program that "realizes" them. When I write e in my program that does not
mean (no pun (:-)) computability of transcendental numbers by that program.
You certainly could argue that it also does not mean they were computable
by my brain, but as we know little if anything about how brains function,
it could not serve as an argument.
>
> As before, McCarthy has always said otherwise, and with a few quibbles
> I agree with him, that ordinary computer programs are the right sort
> of mechanisms, and any program that works is already somewhere well up
> the scale of intelligence. How far? I don't know - if a rock is zero
> and Britney Spears is 100, then maybe Internet Explorer 6.0 is ...
> hey, 6.0, why not?
Because Windows 3.1, 3.11, 95, 98, 2000, XP! (:-))
> Of course, we have the old problem of what is
> intelligent? Is a dog intelligent? A worm? A paramecium?
No, you have a problem proclaiming intelligence a measurable set, the
intelligence measure additive etc.
>
> Physics can.
Yes, Pentium = Retort, Brain = High-energy particle accelerator
> Anyway, that's their problem. I don't need to transmute anything,
> Intel has done the chemistry and physics for me, Mssrs. Volta and
> Ampere have provided the juice, and all that's left is a little
> fiddling. If it's magic to you, I'm even more proud of myself! "Any
> sufficiently advanced technology", and all that.
(BTW, Clarke was wrong. I think it was Lem first has pointed out that the
word "magic" should be replaced with "nature")
>
> One bit: bAwareOfUniverse = True. There y'go!
That is the crux of the problem. If you don't have a special hardware wired
to that bit, then setting that bit *means* nothing. Consider the hardware
is fixed to MOV, JMP etc. Then according to your idea "being aware of the
universe" should be decomposable:
B. Spears has 100 awareness of the universe (OK, maybe, a bit less (:-))
Internet Explorer 6.0 has 0.6 of.
A rock is unaware.
It does not look much promising.
> All I said is, I don't need to compute the clock.
Because you have it as a hardware. You could also have a hardware aware of
the universe. Then you could say, I don't need to compute the awareness and
set the bit in hardware port. My question is, who will become aware of the
universe, the bit or the hardware?
>
> To the contrary, we're pretty certain we do know, we just don't have
> an empirical proof. What we could use, however, is a LOT more clarity
> on just what the issues are and the coherent arguments and positions
> should be. We are not likely to trip across that working program,
> until we get a lot more basic principles mapped out.
I certainly agree with the second [negative] part. As for the positive one,
well, it makes fun to read old books (from 50-60's) on this subject. Guys
were quite optimistic that time... And, I have an impression that all ideas
circulating today, can be found in these books. Is a dual-core 4GHz stone
better than a homeostasis machine, except that it runs IE 6.0?
>
> Doesn't matter.
>
> There are plenty of computable things I do not understand, but use
> anyway. I don't know how to bake a cake, but it's still delicious and
> fattening. The universe is very accomodating that way. I see no
> issues at all.
The issue is in deciding to bake a cake. You have a reasoning like: it is
delicious, so I want it. Why one should imply another? For a program *we*
know, why, because we have programmed it for our purpose. There is a rule
in the production rules base: IF X is delicious, THEN grab X.
> NB - in fact, I've just been reading Wittgenstein's writing on
> mathematics. He is famously skeptical that we really know how to
> produce an infinite, or even finite, sequence of numbers, like 2, 4,
> 6, 8, ... he says it's all just consensus, not "knowledge". He became
> his own kind of finitist after 1928, rejecting Cantor. He was
> famously skeptical that Godel's theorem was valid. He was famously
> skeptical that Turing had said anything interesting. Yet he made the
> same mistake you (and most others) make, about whether one can "know"
> something complex by its handle, like Godel "knowing" the truth of his
> theorem tho it is unprovable from within. Remnant Platonism. If you
> choose to add an axiom to your system, "X is true", then what you know
> is that "I believe that X is true", your mere statement of it does not
> magically give you true understanding of X.
>
> Yes, of course this is very argumentative, ... but you asked.
Yes, it is very close. Hating Platonism as much as you, but how are you
going to reconcile it with your own words about the substrate? If the
substrate of computing is fixed, then you cannot jump over it, over the
given set of production rules programmed by whom?
>
> Um, we're all garbled up here.
>
> Chess may be formally "incomputable" before the universe dissolves,
> but we all live our lives anyway, and even play some chess.
>
> Meaning is just about what *is* computable, and that turns out to be
> plenty.
Meaning is about what is *not* computable, but it seems that we looking on
it from different sides.
>
> I doubt there is such a thing as an incomputable intelligence, that
> would indeed be magic.
Yet, we can solve some incomputable problems. Technically already a random
choice is magic.
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-17, 8:07 am |
| On Mon, 16 Apr 2007 16:50:06 +0200, Alexandr Savinov wrote:
> Dmitry A. Kazakov schrieb:
>
> Actually, I am using terms "intelligent", "complex", "well organized" as
> synonyms. One measure of complexity (intelligence) might be quantity of
> information.
It constitutes a vicious circle: information depends on meaning, that
depends on understanding of, that depends on intelligence. Here you are.
In any case it does not work to me. There is no meaning and no information
without the recipient of.
On the other hand an intelligent system is thought as self-sufficient. I
mean you are intelligent even if you don't participate in a conversation
with somebody carrying out a Turing test.
> One million of beer cans is not very informative - it could
> be compressed into very small zip-archive. A more intelligent system
> contains more information. But of course, the issue not so simple and I
> understand that this criterion is rather shallow.
I agree with topmind's response to that.
> If more intelligent system would be interested in us then we would feel
> like cows in a farm. Indeed, cows should be quite happy with their life
> because they have everything they need. But what is more interesting,
> they probably "think" that this life is their own achievement. (Frankly,
> I think that our society is very similar to such a farm.)
>
> If more intelligent system is not very interested in us then we would
> live as usual without any mutual influence (like insects). We might be a
> goal for some research activity but not more.
The point is that if there is no *any* way to determine whether the hay we
are chewing is a product of farming activity or had grown by itself, then
there is no any difference = higher intelligence does not exist.
Non-falsifiable theories is a subject of belief rather than science. The
notion of incognizable things quickly derails any universal framework of
thought.
>
> Having a technology for creating a thing of some complexity
> (intelligence) assumes that tools and the person doing that has at least
> the same complexity. In other words, a system can create systems with
> the same or less complexity (intelligence).
This is in question. For all it depends on the definition of intelligence.
Assuming intelligence [measure of] countable, ordered, which, I presume, is
basically the core of Joshua's view, there will be obvious problems with
your statement. Consider multicellular organisms as a counterexample.
If intelligence can be increased all along its scale, then you can climb
the ladder bit by bit.
If intelligence measure has a structure of larger sets, then there exist
impenetrable barriers which cannot be taken. The question is whether we
themselves are before or after the first such barrier.
> But intelligent system
> can arise as a result of its own evolution, i.e., due to some other laws
> and partially because of the activity of existing systems and the
> existing environment stack (biosphere etc.) In other words, intelligence
> can appear at the top of the existing organization stack where previous
> elements are unaware of the next elements.
This is why I asked whether the universe (or the laws of evolution) is
computable. If it is, then we can create intelligent systems. If it is not,
then according to your thesis we cannot make any use of that.
> By an intelligent system you probably understand simulation of
> intelligence by a tool or subsystem like chess playing or
> question-answer systems. It of course requires a kind of intelligence
> for its behavior to look smart and human-like. But I mean something more
> fundamental, i.e., something that may exist by itself, has its own goals
> etc.
Basically I see no difference. The application field for intelligence is a
second question. The first question is the computational power required for
that.
Of course, there could be completely alternative views, like that it is the
application which forms the intelligence. So that the latter even cannot
exist without the environment. That would mean that fundamentally any
computational abstraction does not work. (a sort of neo-Lysenkoism)
--
Regards,
Dmitry A. Kazakov
http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de
| |
| JXStern 2007-04-17, 7:07 pm |
| On Tue, 17 Apr 2007 10:39:00 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
<mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>
>No, you have a problem proclaiming intelligence a measurable set, the
>intelligence measure additive etc.
Agreed. In the end, any word means just what you - that is, we -
choose it to mean - Humpty Dumpty was right!
>
>That is the crux of the problem. If you don't have a special hardware wired
>to that bit, then setting that bit *means* nothing. Consider the hardware
>is fixed to MOV, JMP etc. Then according to your idea "being aware of the
>universe" should be decomposable:
>
>B. Spears has 100 awareness of the universe (OK, maybe, a bit less (:-))
>Internet Explorer 6.0 has 0.6 of.
>A rock is unaware.
>
>It does not look much promising.
Let me try again. Are you claiming that you are aware of the
universe? What could that possibly mean? Do you know what I have in
my pocket?
>
>Because you have it as a hardware. You could also have a hardware aware of
>the universe. Then you could say, I don't need to compute the awareness and
>set the bit in hardware port. My question is, who will become aware of the
>universe, the bit or the hardware?
Who will "become aware" of the Microsoft web site, this bit or your
browser ... or some complex involving several elements? Maybe
intelligence just doesn't reduce past that, but maybe bits and
processor, and energy and time, are both necessary and sufficient.
>
>I certainly agree with the second [negative] part. As for the positive one,
>well, it makes fun to read old books (from 50-60's) on this subject. Guys
>were quite optimistic that time... And, I have an impression that all ideas
>circulating today, can be found in these books. Is a dual-core 4GHz stone
>better than a homeostasis machine, except that it runs IE 6.0?
I'd say 95% of the issue was addresed by Turing's 1936 paper OCN, and
95% of the remainder was addressed by Turing's 1950 paper CMAI. And
much of the issue was debated in Decartes' time. And if I knew my
Plato and Aristotle better, I'm sure much of it was debated then.
We're getting asymptotically close to the answer by brute force.
Jerry Fodor is (in)famous for saying the computational theory of
intelligence "is the only theory we've got", but in the end, he
despairs of it. He's right the first time, his despair is based on
confusions. In my humble opinion!
>
>The issue is in deciding to bake a cake.
Isn't decision or free will or whatever a different question from
meaning, or even intelligence?
>Yes, it is very close. Hating Platonism as much as you, but how are you
>going to reconcile it with your own words about the substrate? If the
>substrate of computing is fixed, then you cannot jump over it, over the
>given set of production rules programmed by whom?
By whomever.
The substrate is a problem, but not much, really. Since Euclid people
have built systems on axioms and logic. An axiom is stipulated, and
that is your substrate. Actual agents (eg, people) are limited and
make mistakes. I see no problem, except deflecting Platonistic
expectations of omniscience and perfection.
>
>Meaning is about what is *not* computable, but it seems that we looking on
>it from different sides.
Yes, and I recommend my side. I recognize the need for much more
extensive arguments, but I think I have a pretty consistent and
promising set of points to connect and justify.
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to exercise it!
Josh
| |
| Eliot Miranda 2007-04-17, 7:07 pm |
| topmind wrote:
> Eliot Miranda wrote:
>
> A Star Trek game where time can run backwards. Also, simulations of
> universes with different constants have been done by researchers to
> explore the Anthropic Principle.
As carefully as you can try to explain where and how these two
computations take place.
> Or do you mean not influenced in any way by our universe. That may be
> a tall order because it is hard to measure influence (bias) of any
> phoney world created in math.
Have you been reading what I've been saying? I'm done repeating myself.
--
The surest sign that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the universe
is that its too depressing to consider Topmind to be top mind.
--
Eliot ,,,^..^,,, Smalltalk - scene not herd
| |
| Alexandr Savinov 2007-04-18, 10:06 pm |
| topmind schrieb:
> Are you saying that we couldn't build a computer/bot smarter than us
> (without using evolution such as genetic algs.)? I don't think there
> is any proven law that says this.
Yes, I think that creating something always means copying or modelling
part of us without complexity increase. So we only express ourselves in
the things we create which therefore cannot be smarter. I seriously
doubt that such types of statements can be formally proven. It is too
general and therefore it is part of our view of the world.
>
> So *only* evolution can create intelligence? This is only speculation.
> I would tend to disagree. If we figured out how the brain worked, I
> think we could refine the principles it is based on and improve it.
If we discover how the brain works then we will cease to be humans. If
we understand how we can enhance the brain then again we simultaneously
change ourselves. When monkeys understood that they are monkeys then
they turned into humans. When we understand how our brain works we will
not be humans anymore.
--
http://conceptoriented.com
| |
| Dmitry A. Kazakov 2007-04-18, 10:06 pm |
| On Tue, 17 Apr 2007 15:59:21 GMT, JXStern wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Apr 2007 10:39:00 +0200, "Dmitry A. Kazakov"
> <mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de> wrote:
>
>
> Let me try again. Are you claiming that you are aware of the
> universe? What could that possibly mean? Do you know what I have in
> my pocket?
The Great Ring of Power? (:-))
But I also cannot answer your question, because IMO a real answer should be
computationally equivalent to construction of an intelligent system. The
only way, I could honestly answer it, is by presenting a sufficient
description of this awareness, which I believe is technically same as to
present a system having that awareness.
[OK, there is another way of answering, that is by genesis of a new
universe, but let's leave that to future generations. (:-))]
>
> Who will "become aware" of the Microsoft web site, this bit or your
> browser ... or some complex involving several elements?
DNS server will, which means nothing but a state which we, programmers,
have associated with its awareness of the web site. The difference is that
this sort of awareness as defined is known to be computable and thus is
uninteresting. On the contrary, awareness of the universe might be
incomputable because the universe is incomputable. Your argument is that we
don't need to be incomputable to become aware of incomputable thi | | |