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[OT} Wittgenstein and Meaning (was Re: Perfrom Thru)
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| Rick Smith 2004-04-15, 7:30 am |
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<docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c4f7p6$iae$1@panix5.panix.com...
> In article <106m59bks0749ad@corp.supernews.com>,
> Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
news:c4e6ji$ljd$1@panix1.panix.com...[color=darkred]
[snip][color=darkred]
'syntax'[color=darkred]
[snip][color=darkred]
>
> Stetz fnirp g'noozh tel igniptakich, Mr Stevens... consider the meaning of
> that. Unless you wish to posit a world in which a thing-in-itself can be
> transmitted by language Wittgenstein still seems to have a more accurate
> view.
< http://www.m-w.com/ > meaning : '1 a : the thing one intends to
convey especially by language'.
< http://www.m-w.com/ > interpret : '1 : to explain or tell the meaning
of : present in understandable terms'.
Antony Flew, "A Dictionary of Philosophy," interpretation : 'The
assigning of meanings to the expressions of a formal language.'
Mr Dwarf, from the common definitions, it would appear that
interpretation cannot occur until the meaning is known. That is,
how can the reader 'explain or tell the meaning of' without first
knowing 'the thing [the author] intends to convey'? Thus, meaning
cannot be the result of interpretation.
However, understanding that Wittgenstein was a philospher who
worked with languages and borrowing from Flew, I could find, by
interpretation, that Wittgenstein may have intended that '[the]
meaning [assigned to an expression] is the result of interpretation'.
Of course, if my interpretation is not what Wittgenstein intended,
then '[my] use of interpretation [would have led] to [a]
misunderstanding.'
On the other hand, if 'meaning is the result of interpretation' was
intended to explain how one decides 'the thing one intends to
convey', then the quote seems inappropriate for the context of
the prior discussion (interpretation of words). Within the context
of deciding 'the thing one intends to convey' it is not necessary
'to posit a world in which a thing-in-itself can be transmitted by
language' since a thing-for-others serves that purpose nicely.
| |
| docdwarf@panix.com 2004-04-15, 10:30 am |
| In article <107spv3499u0j68@corp.supernews.com>,
Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
>
><docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c4f7p6$iae$1@panix5.panix.com...
>news:c4e6ji$ljd$1@panix1.panix.com...
>[snip]
>[snip]
>
>< http://www.m-w.com/ > meaning : '1 a : the thing one intends to
>convey especially by language'.
>
>< http://www.m-w.com/ > interpret : '1 : to explain or tell the meaning
>of : present in understandable terms'.
>
>Antony Flew, "A Dictionary of Philosophy," interpretation : 'The
>assigning of meanings to the expressions of a formal language.'
L Wittgenstein: 'The meaning of a word is in its use'.
>
>Mr Dwarf, from the common definitions, it would appear that
>interpretation cannot occur until the meaning is known.
This might be a reason for my using Wittgenstein's technical definition
instead of the common ones. When I address how the speaker uses (applies)
a word I refer to 'intention', when I address how a listener uses
(applies) a word I speak of 'interpretation'... and I try to avoid
'meaning' as imprecise because of situations like:
Person A: 'When I say (x) it means (y).'
Person B: 'No, when you say (x) it means (z).'
.... as they both confer a 'meaning' which exists outside of use. Consider
the classic:
'Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a banana.'
What is the 'meaning' of 'fruit' here? It may be intended one way and
interpreted another; that is why I employ:
Person A; 'When I say (x) I intend (y).'
Person B: 'When you say (x) I interpret it as (z).'
.... thus clearly delineating the language as a medium which is used by
humans and not a representation of reified concepts.
DD
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| Rick Smith 2004-04-15, 2:30 pm |
|
<docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c5m2e2$m4o$1@panix5.panix.com...
> In article <107spv3499u0j68@corp.supernews.com>,
> Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
news:c4f7p6$iae$1@panix5.panix.com...[color=darkred]
Mr[color=darkred]
'syntax'[color=darkred]
thread.[color=darkred]
of[color=darkred]
be[color=darkred]
accurate[color=darkred]
>
> L Wittgenstein: 'The meaning of a word is in its use'.
Ah! Similar to Rev Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, 'When I use a
word it means ...'. Many years ago -- I don't recall the
circumstances -- I found it necessary to conclude that words
have definitions and that meaning consists in how words are
used in context. For example, when you wrote, above, 'Stevens'
instead of 'Smith', I knew what you meant though the definitions
are not the same.
>
> This might be a reason for my using Wittgenstein's technical definition
> instead of the common ones. When I address how the speaker uses (applies)
> a word I refer to 'intention', when I address how a listener uses
> (applies) a word I speak of 'interpretation'... and I try to avoid
> 'meaning' as imprecise because of situations like:
>
> Person A: 'When I say (x) it means (y).'
> Person B: 'No, when you say (x) it means (z).'
>
> ... as they both confer a 'meaning' which exists outside of use. Consider
> the classic:
>
> 'Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a banana.'
>
> What is the 'meaning' of 'fruit' here?
My position is that the 'definition' of 'fruit' is fixed by the context.
> It may be intended one way and
> interpreted another; that is why I employ:
>
> Person A; 'When I say (x) I intend (y).'
> Person B: 'When you say (x) I interpret it as (z).'
>
> ... thus clearly delineating the language as a medium which is used by
> humans and not a representation of reified concepts.
Reified, I like that! In considering my previous response, I examined
the idea that 'meaning' is concrete and 'language' is abstract.
Specifically, that meaning is something concrete that exists between
the thing-for-others and the expression. In effect, vocabulary size and
facility with language will affect how well the intent is conveyed.
Instead, I chose to state 'a thing-for-others serves that purpose nicely'.
| |
| docdwarf@panix.com 2004-04-15, 4:30 pm |
| In article <107thkh60rere37@corp.supernews.com>,
Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
>
><docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c5m2e2$m4o$1@panix5.panix.com...
>news:c4f7p6$iae$1@panix5.panix.com...
>
>Ah! Similar to Rev Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, 'When I use a
>word it means ...'.
Not quite... Humpty Dumpty did not seem to be taking into account
language's function of conveying, from one to another.
>Many years ago -- I don't recall the
>circumstances -- I found it necessary to conclude that words
>have definitions and that meaning consists in how words are
>used in context.
'... meaning consists on how words are used in context' appears to rather
close to 'Meaning is in use', aye.
>For example, when you wrote, above, 'Stevens'
>instead of 'Smith', I knew what you meant though the definitions
>are not the same.
You might have guessed my intention, Mr Smith, and you might even have
been correct... this once. As Wittgenstein asked on a different occaision
- and here taken completely out of context - 'Or are we to say that we
usually don't encounter such difficulties and things seem to work out
alright, most of the time?'
>
>
>My position is that the 'definition' of 'fruit' is fixed by the context.
Hmmmmm... then, perhaps, the definition of fruit here is 'that which flies
like a banana'.
>
>
>Reified, I like that!
It can be a juicy concept out of which to make a mental snack; reification
is the process by which an abstract is made to be considered as a concrete
thing (res + faciere).
One can say 'this is a good table' and 'this is a good example';
'goodness' in such cases most frequently involves how the item in question
fulfills the role of the object (table, example). To speak of 'good'
outside of an object (frequently encountered in the Platonic application
of 'forms' or the 'eidos') is reification... what sense is to be made of
this?
'This table partakes of the form/essence/eidos of The Good'.
>In considering my previous response, I examined
>the idea that 'meaning' is concrete and 'language' is abstract.
'Intention' may be considered concrete... 'I, as the speaker/author, wish
to convey (x).' Language is the vehicle and 'meaning' is, I would say,
what happens when intention and interpretation match.
>Specifically, that meaning is something concrete that exists between
>the thing-for-others and the expression. In effect, vocabulary size and
>facility with language will affect how well the intent is conveyed.
Consider another Wittgensteinian example, the one of what he called
'ultimate language', where two men are building a wall. One holds out his
hand and says 'Brick!'... and the other puts a brick in that hand.
>Instead, I chose to state 'a thing-for-others serves that purpose nicely'.
Things seem to work out alright, most of the time.
DD
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| berlutte@sympatico.ca 2004-04-15, 10:30 pm |
| On 15 Apr 2004 09:24:18 -0400, docdwarf@panix.com wrote:
>'Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a banana.'
>
>What is the 'meaning' of 'fruit' here?
What would be life without a bit o' mystery, old fruitcake!
Jennifer Secks
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| Richard 2004-04-16, 8:30 am |
| docdwarf@panix.com wrote
>
> Not quite... Humpty Dumpty ...
It was 'not quite' Humpty Dumpty but another egg shaped character entirely.
| |
| docdwarf@panix.com 2004-04-16, 8:30 am |
| In article <217e491a.0404152136.2639e52f@posting.google.com>,
Richard <riplin@Azonic.co.nz> wrote:
>docdwarf@panix.com wrote
>
>
>It was 'not quite' Humpty Dumpty but another egg shaped character entirely.
Mr Plinston, the quotation I was referring to might be found here:
http://www.bartleby.com/73/2019.html
--begin quoted text:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
--end quoted text
Did you have another one in mind?
DD
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| Rick Smith 2004-04-16, 8:30 am |
|
<docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c5mmsl$at5$1@panix5.panix.com...
> In article <107thkh60rere37@corp.supernews.com>,
[snip]
> One can say 'this is a good table' and 'this is a good example';
> 'goodness' in such cases most frequently involves how the item in question
> fulfills the role of the object (table, example). To speak of 'good'
> outside of an object (frequently encountered in the Platonic application
> of 'forms' or the 'eidos') is reification... what sense is to be made of
> this?
>
> 'This table partakes of the form/essence/eidos of The Good'.
I tried to make sense of it by thinking of other uses of 'good'; but
certain associations clouded my thinking.
'This is a good table' reminded me of a woman I met in 1970.
She expressed a preference such that holding on to a table
was her idea of good.
'It's good to be the King', from "The History of the World, Part II"
(I think it was Part II) evokes a similar image of good.
'I didn't do good in English' (overheard in a bookstore, twice, by
the same female speaker) might allow one to imagine a woman
s ing ... well, correction ... and, in such a position, the same
essence of good might be appropriate.
But this has nothing to do with Platonic application of forms,
does it? Except that ... well ... given certain accounts of Plato's
personal life, the form might be similar.
In any case, I've lost it and I apologize for any offense.
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| docdwarf@panix.com 2004-04-16, 10:30 am |
| In article <107vcj3119ke746@corp.supernews.com>,
Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
>
><docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c5mmsl$at5$1@panix5.panix.com...
>[snip]
>
>I tried to make sense of it by thinking of other uses of 'good'; but
>certain associations clouded my thinking.
It might be time to turn to outside sources, then... I dashed off the
above ex tempore, as with much of my posting, but a quick search with
Google brought up
http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/f5.htm
--begin quoted text:
Forms, Platonic {Gk. eide [eide]}
The pure objects of mathematical and dialectical knowledge. In the
vigorous realism of Plato's middle dialogues, necessary truths are taken
to involve knowledge of eternal, unchanging Forms (or Ideas). Particular
things in the realm of appearance are beautiful, or equal, or good only
insofar as they participate in the universal Forms of Beauty, Equality, or
the Good. The doctrine of Forms was attacked in Plato's own Parmenides and
by Aristotle.
--end quoted text
[snip]
>In any case, I've lost it and I apologize for any offense.
Not to worry o'ermuch, I'd say.
DD
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| Rick Smith 2004-04-19, 10:30 am |
|
<docdwarf@panix.com> wrote in message news:c5ojhh$aou$1@panix5.panix.com...
> In article <107vcj3119ke746@corp.supernews.com>,
> Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
news:c5mmsl$at5$1@panix5.panix.com...[color=darkred]
question[color=darkred]
application[color=darkred]
of[color=darkred]
>
> It might be time to turn to outside sources, then... I dashed off the
> above ex tempore, as with much of my posting, but a quick search with
> Google brought up
>
> http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/f5.htm
>
> --begin quoted text:
>
> Forms, Platonic {Gk. eide [eide]}
>
> The pure objects of mathematical and dialectical knowledge. In the
> vigorous realism of Plato's middle dialogues, necessary truths are taken
> to involve knowledge of eternal, unchanging Forms (or Ideas). Particular
> things in the realm of appearance are beautiful, or equal, or good only
> insofar as they participate in the universal Forms of Beauty, Equality, or
> the Good. The doctrine of Forms was attacked in Plato's own Parmenides and
> by Aristotle.
>
> --end quoted text
During the past three days, I have discovered that philosophy,
in general, has, for me, a sleep-inducing quality and finally
recalled that, about ten years ago, I re-read "Being and
Nothingness" for that very effect.
However, about three years ago, I visually scanned "Being
and Nothingness" searching for a particular quote that I did
not find. I was interested in the context. The quote is: 'It is not
mere caprice that causes us to do often and without annoyance
what would irritate us if commanded by another. That is
because the command and the prohibition causes us to
experience the others freedom across our own slavery.' I
suspect it may be a difference in translation. Nonetheless, I
did re-read a passage on Sadism that reminded me of the
US Congress.
While I found Sartre to be interesting, I found Flew's,
"A Dictionary of Philosophy", entry on Sir Karl Raimund
Popper to be facinating. What Popper provides is that
when experts and others make assertions, that are
'unrestricted generalizations', such assertions may be
'falsified'. Thus, if one can find an 'error of commission'
or, the more difficult to find, 'error of omission', one can,
by exposing the error, 'falsify' the assertion. In theory this
should be sufficient to alter the perception of others. But
when I exposed two such errors to a member of the
US Congress, a certain causal relationship was denied
by using a political definition of 'proximate cause' rather
the the legal definition. There was no response to the
exposure of the other error.
I have yet to present the description of the first error to any
expert. It is so controversial that I wanted the protection
of an intermediary. That is, I cannot force experts to review
their knowledge to confirm what I have found; but an
intermediary, in a position of civil authority, can deny further
subjection to the wrongful opinion of those experts until a
review is done.
Here I want to address the sleep-inducing quality of philosophy.
Flew's entry on Hegel contains the following: "... Kant argued
that the mind is not in a purely passive relation to its objects,
but contibutes much to them. Much, but not all; there are also
'things-in-themselves', that are wholly independent of any
mind, and contribute something to the objects that we know.
Things-in-themselves can be thought, but not known, in that
they are beyond the reach of experience, whereas the
knowledge of objects involves the possibility of experience.
Like Kant, Hegel was concerned with truths that are necessary,
but not necessary in the way that truths of formal logic are
necessary. But whereas Kant's main concern was with the
necessary truths presupposed by the natural sciences, Hegel
was more concerned with the necessary truths provided by
history, which he regarded as a process that follows necessary
laws. Hegel agreed with Kant that necessary truths must be
mind-imposed, but, like other critics of Kant, he rejected the
idea of the thing-in-itself as unintelligible. This led him to the
view that all that exists must be mental."
At the risk of over-simplification (and error), I offer the following
analogy from baseball. A thing-in-itself is like a pitch-in-itself;
that is, a ball in the pitcher's glove, an unrealized potential.
A thing-for-itself is like a pitch-for-itself; that is, the pitcher's
movement of the ball is a movement toward the realization of
pitch's potential. A thing-for-others is like a pitch-for-others; that
is, the realized potential, a balk, a wild pitch, a ball, a strike, a
pop-up, a line drive, a home run, whatever. Thus
things-in-themselves may be understood as the undiscovered
and things-for-others as that which is discovered. All discovery
and invention is the translation of a thing-in-itself to a
thing-for-others. From the above passage, Kant seems to have
recognized this about things-in-themselves; but this is not so of
Hegel. But my understanding comes from Sartre not Kant.
To the extent that recent philosophers have addressed the
same problems as the older and ancient philosophers and
provide a more complete and understandable explanation, the
study of the old and ancient is ... well ... boring.
Even Hegel's triads (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) cannot
compete with Popper's falsification as a means for advancing
knowledge. That is, how can one know what is rational in the
thesis and antithesis and, therefore, should appear in the
synthesis? I know of one such synthesis that failed to include
ethical considerations and therefore has resulted in persecution
that is still ongoing. (I am aware of the arguments, both thesis
and antithesis, and I will not discuss it further here because of
the ethical considerations.) What I am to learn from further
study of Hegel? That which is not to be believed?
| |
| docdwarf@panix.com 2004-04-19, 2:30 pm |
| In article <1087lm0ej1s6ve0@corp.supernews.com>,
Rick Smith <ricksmith@mfi.net> wrote:
[snip]
>During the past three days, I have discovered that philosophy,
>in general, has, for me, a sleep-inducing quality and finally
>recalled that, about ten years ago, I re-read "Being and
>Nothingness" for that very effect.
Some might argue that using Sartre towards this end is nigh criminal...
.... while Sartre himself argues that if one is willing to accept the
punsihment one can commit any crime.
DD
| |
| berlutte@sympatico.ca 2004-04-19, 6:30 pm |
| On 19 Apr 2004 13:19:39 -0400, docdwarf@panix.com wrote:
>Some might argue that using Sartre towards this end is nigh criminal...
>
>... while Sartre himself argues that if one is willing to accept the
>punsihment one can commit any crime.
Wadda reepartee Yer Eggheadness!
Nuthin' beats the Olde Craesus's essay on wizdumb:
'If you can start the day without caffeine,
If you can get going without pep pills,
If you can always be cheerful,
ignoring aches and pains,
If you can resist complaining and
boring people with your troubles,
If you can eat the same food every
day and be grateful for it,
If you can understand when your loved
ones are too busy to give you any time,
If you can overlook it when those you love
take it out on you when, through no fault
of yours, something goes wrong,
If you can take criticism and
blame without resentment,
If you can ignore a friend's limited
education and never correct him,
If you can resist treating a rich friend
better than a poor friend,
If you can face the world
without lies and deceit,
If you can conquer tension
without medical help,
If you can relax without liquor,
If you can sleep without the aid of drugs,
Then You Are Probably An Ol' Yeller Dawg'
Craesus 'Liberate Aurum de Loco Nanus Urbis et Orbis', page 2345
| |
| berlutte@sympatico.ca 2004-04-19, 8:30 pm |
| On 19 Apr 2004 13:19:39 -0400, docdwarf@panix.com wrote:
>Some might argue that using Sartre towards this end is nigh criminal...
>
>... while Sartre himself argues that if one is willing to accept the
>punsihment one can commit any crime.
!!!BREAKING!!!
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=sto...video&printer=1
"A Secret Service agent named McNally "noted that this fact is
significant due to the fact that the security video shows the Ryder
truck pulling up to the Federal Building and then pausing (7 to 10
seconds) before resuming into the slot in front of the building," the
log said. "It is speculated that the woman was signaling the truck
when a slot became available.'
========================================
=================
Wadda ya say, ol' spinner? Ya think some will *e'er* be punished?
McVeigh sure did, fair trial and all!
LOL
One more proof on how utterly clueless nouveau riche you have become,
old drafty. I remember fondly how you brayed about "second-rate
paranois'. From JFK to 911, all was crystal clear and white starched.
'Jes nuthin' to see here, keep goin' folks'
Ghastly really!
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